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ONE WORD CAN MAKE ALL THE DIFFERENCE: AN EXAMINATION
OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S HANDLING OF HEALTH CARE
INSURANCE POLICY EXCLUSION CLAUSES FOR
PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been an increase in concern over adequate
health care.' Insurance companies and consumers alike have become in-
creasingly aware of the rise in the cost of health care. 2 Insurance compa-
nies have taken great pains in writing their health care policies, for
companies do not want to incur any more expense than is necessary. 3 A
particularly problematic situation for insurance companies is how to deal
with the pre-existing condition. Most health care insurance policies ex-
clude pre-existing conditions from coverage.4 Exactly what constitutes a
pre-existing condition can be difficult to define. 5 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently joined a growing number of cir-
cuit courts in holding that:
[A] health insurance policy, which expressly excludes coverage
for a "sickness . . . for which medical advice or treatment was
recommended by a physician" within the five years preceding the
date of coverage, will not exclude a claim where the insured ex-
1. SeeJennifer M. Franco, Note, Undermining the Protection of Health Insurance:
The Preexisting Condition Clause, 30 NEw ENG. L. REv. 883, 883 (1996) (stating that
"escalating costs of health care and the insecurity of health insurance have
prompted several proposals to reform the current health system in America").
2. See John C. Williams, Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision in
Health or Hospitalization Policy Excluding or Postponing Coverage of Illness for Which Med-
ical Care or Treatment Was Received Within Stated Time Preceding or Following Issuance of
Policy, 95 A.L.R.3D 1290, 1291 (1979) (noting impact of rising health care costs on
both insurance consumer and insurance companies).
3. See id. at 1292 (explaining that insurance companies limit liability with
these exclusion clauses in force).
4. See Franco, supra note 1, at 886 (detailing why insurance companies draft
exclusion clauses). In general, "[a] pre-existing condition clause is drafted to pro-
hibit, restrict, or postpone coverage for an illness which either predated the insur-
ance contract or developed during a prescribed waiting period after the insurance
contract has been executed." Id.
5. See id. (explaining different ways provision for pre-existing condition can
be drafted). There are three different kinds of provisions:
(1) a restriction that remains until a designated period after the date of
the insurance policy; (2) a restriction that remains until the insured has
not received medical treatment for the condition during a designated
period; or (3) a limitation of the amount of coverage provided for in-
sured conditions associated with a pre-existing condition.
Id. at 886-87.
(1355)
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periences symptoms before, but is not correctly diagnosed until
after, the policy goes into effect.
6
This Casebrief explains the Third Circuit's treatment of health insur-
ance policy exclusion clauses relating to pre-existing conditions. Part II
explains the nature of policy exclusion clauses-provisions of health care
policies excluding coverage of an illness for which medical care was re-
ceived prior to the issuance of the policy.7 Part III analyzes the Third
Circuit's most recent pronouncement on the handling of exclusions for
pre-existing conditions. 8 Part IV focuses on other federal courts' treat-
ment of similar or even identical policy language. 9 Part V touches on pol-
icy issues and other implications in light of the Third Circuit's ruling in
Lawson v. Fortis Insurance Co. Io
II. THE MECHANICS OF THE PRE-EXISTING CONDITION
A. Definition of a Pre-existing Condition
What exactly constitutes a pre-existing condition can be difficult to
articulate. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
defines a pre-existing condition as:
The existence of symptoms which would cause an ordinary pru-
dent person to seek diagnosis, care, or treatment or a condition
for which medical advice or treatment was recommended by a
physician or received from a physician within a 5-year period pre-
ceding the effective date of coverage of the insured person.' 1
6. KMZ Rosenman, Pre-Existing Condition Exclusion Does Not Apply to Misdiag-
nosed Condition, LiIG. REP. 6 (Dec. 2002), at http://www.kmzr.com/files/
tbl-s23Publications/FileUpload1 17/1875/Litigation%20Reporter%20-%20De-
cember%202002.pdf (quoting Lawson v. Fortis Ins. Co., 301 F.3d 159, 162 (3d Cir.
2002) and discussing holding); see Lawson v. Fortis Ins. Co., 301 F.3d 159, 162 (3d
Cir. 2002) (reasoning that physician cannot provide treatment "for" condition
without knowing what condition is). The court differentiated between "a sus-
pected condition without a confirmatory diagnosis" and "a misdiagnosis or an un-
suspected condition manifesting non-specific symptoms." Id. at 166. The court
determined that this case resembles "a misdiagnosis or an unsuspected condition
manifesting non-specific symptoms." Id. (noting differences in kinds of
conditions).
7. For a further discussion of the mechanics of pre-existing exclusion clauses,
see infra notes 11-26 and accompanying text.
8. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's approach to pre-existing condition
policy language, see infra notes 27-78 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the other federal courts' treatment of pre-existing con-
dition clauses, see infra notes 79-128 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the policy implications of the Lawson holding for insur-
ance consumers and insurance companies, see infra notes 129-53 and accompany-
ing text.
11. Franco, supra note 1, at 886 (citing model definition); see 31 PA. CODE
§ 88.52 (2003) (providing similar definition for pre-existing condition). The
Pennsylvania regulations define pre-existing condition as "[a] condition for which
medical advice or treatment was recommended by a physician or received by a
1356 [Vol. 48: p. 1355
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There is also a temporal notion to the idea of a pre-existing condition.
Courts have introduced various interpretations of when an illness actually
begins. 12 Courts have defined manifestation of an illness in three differ-
ent ways: "(1) at the time of its medical inception; (2) when the condition
impaired the normal function of the body; or (3) when a person had ac-
tual knowledge of the condition's presence." 13 In the insurance context, a
condition exists when an illness manifests itself; however, condition is not
always the same as diagnosis. 14 In some policies, a diagnosis is not even a
prerequisite for a finding of a pre-existing condition) 5
B. Nature of the Policy Exclusion
Insurance companies use a policy exclusion provision to eliminate
coverage for pre-existing conditions. 16 Insurance companies put exclu-
sion clauses in their policies for a very important reason-to save their
other policyholders money.' 7 An insurance company operates by having
its policyholders pay premiums, and the insurance company uses that
money to pay for any losses incurred on the part of its insured individu-
als.' 8 If an insurance company covered already-existing conditions, the
physician within a 5-year period preceding the effective date of the coverage of the
insured person." Id.
12. See Franco, supra note 1, at 887 (commenting on conflict among courts as
to what is considered manifestation).
13. Id. (quoting Barbara L. Pedersen, Comment, HIV/AIDS and the Pre-existing
Health Condition Standard: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REv.
653, 666 (1990)). Courts differ in their explanations of the temporal beginning of
an illness. See id. ("Courts, however, conflict when deciding precisely what consti-
tutes the manifestation of a disease.").
14. See 14 PA. JUR. 2D Insurance § 13.37 (2002) (defining condition). In the
insurance context, illness can take on many definitional constrlctions. See id.
(contrasting "sickness" and "diagnosis" in context of pre-existing conditions).
15. See id. (explaining that diagnosis is not dispositive of pre-existing condi-
tion). Generally, "unless the policy specifies otherwise, there is no requirement
that a diagnosis of a pre-existing condition be made during the specified pre-ex-
isting condition period, or that a diagnosis be absolutely definitive, for a pre-ex-
isting condition exclusion to apply." Id.; see Cury v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
737 F. Supp. 847, 849 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (explaining definition of pre-existing
condition).
16. See Kathryn A. Sampson, The Mouse in the Annotated Bibliography: An Insur-
ance Law Primer, 2000 ARK. L. NOTES 85, 92 (summarizing Franco, supra note 1).
The reviewer here acknowledges that pre-existing condition exclusions are in-
cluded in policies "to prevent insurance coverage for illness which existed before
the insurer and the insured executed the insurance contract and for illnesses
which developed during a waiting period after execution of the insurance con-
tract." Id.
17. See Williams, supra note 2, at 1292 (explaining reason for limitation).
Aware of the amount of money that could be spent on already presenting illnesses,
insurance companies try to limit their liability with the inclusion of these clauses.
See id. (explaining how insuring people already risk-averse will overwhelmingly in-
crease insurance premiums across board).
18. See Franco, supra note 1, at 885-86 (describing how insurance companies
function by "pooling" policyholders' premiums).
20031 1357CASEBRIEF
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company would incur significant costs by attracting people with illnesses
looking to buy policies with premiums that cost less than the treatment.19
Consequently, the insurance company would have to pass these additional
costs on to its other policyholders, 2° resulting in higher premiums for all
those it insures. 2 1
Exclusion clauses can be crafted in several different ways. One kind
of clause provides for the exclusion of an illness "for which medical care
or treatment was received within a stated period of policy coverage," 22 that
is, a person requires medical coverage for a condition within the proba-
tionary period of the policy.23 Another kind of clause excludes coverage
for an illness that originates before the policy is issued.2 4 A final type of
exclusion clause is one that precludes coverage for an illness or condition
for which medical care or treatment was received before the issuance of
the policy.25 The difference between the last two clauses is that the for-
mer excludes illnesses that are known prior to policy issuance while the
latter focuses on treatment received for an unknown or misdiagnosed con-
19. See Steven Pearlstein, Adjusting Insurance: Is It Health Reform? Steps Toward
Expanding Coverage Could Involve 'Guaranteed Issue' and 'Community Rating,' WASI-1.
POST, June 19, 1994, at A4 (discussing how elimination of pre-existing condition
clauses would increase premiums for public).
20. See Franco, supra note 1, at 900-01 (explaining economic need for policy
exclusion). Having exclusions "prevent[s] the public from having to pay the cost
of applicants 'who, knowing that they were already suffering from a disease or
health condition, purchase coverage hoping to get the insurer to pay for the pre-
existing condition."' Id. (quoting Ithamar D. Weed, Pre-Existing Disease as a Defense
in Accident and Sickness Policies, 15 Ass'N LIFE INS. COUNS. 419, 419 (1960-1961)).
21. See Franco, supra note 1, at 901 (noting that clauses protect public from
high insurance costs).
22. Williams, supra note 2, at 1292 (explaining differing constructions of ex-
clusionary clauses). Williams posits that a clause excluding an illness that was
treated prior to the effective date of the policy is a more conservative approach for
insurance companies than policies that "exclud[e] or postpon[e] coverage of ill-
nesses that originated prior to issuance of the policy or within a stated time." Id.
As to the former, Williams explains, "the insurer need not prove that the illness
had originated prior to the issuance of the policy or within a stated time, but
merely that the insured had received medical care or treatment for the illness." Id.
Proving the administration of treatment is far easier than trying to prove that an
illness actually existed. See id. (describing requisite proof of "pre-existing"
condition).
23. See id. (providing examples of construction); see also Davolt v. Executive
Comm. of O'Reilly Auto., 206 F.3d 806, 809-10 (8th Cir. 2000) ("The plan provides
that a preexisting condition includes one that is diagnosed or treated within the
six month period. The plan does not create an exception for on-going treatment
or require that the treatment be an additional form of treatment."); Davey v. N.Y.
Life Ins. Co., 528 So.2d 1228, 1228 (Fla. App. 1988) (noting received treatment
within six months of time became insured tinder group policy), review denied by 537
So.2d 568 (Fla. 1988); Zeh v. Nat'l Hosp. Ass'n 377 P.2d 852, 858 (Or. 1963) (hold-
ing that treatment received within first six months of effective date constituted pre-
existing condition).
24. See Williams, supra note 2, at 1292 (describing different kinds of exclusion
provision constructions).
25. See id. (explaining exclusion clause structure).
1358
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dition.26 This latter kind of exclusionary clause will be the focus of this
Casebrief.
III. ANALYSIS OF LAWSON V. FORTIS INSURANCE Co.: WHAT Is TREATMENT
"FOR" AN ILLNESS?
A. Facts of Lawson v. Fortis Insurance Co.
On October 7, 1998, Joseph Lawson purchased a health insurance
policy for himself and his minor child, Elena, to become effective on Octo-
ber 9, 1998.27 On October 7, Elena's mother took Elena to the emergency
room because Elena was suffering from a hacking cough, a fever, an ele-
vated pulse rate and a swollen right eye. 28 Doctors diagnosed her with an
upper respiratory tract infection and prescribed antibiotics. 29 Elena's
symptoms persisted, and on October 14, Elena's grandmother took her to
a pediatrician who ordered more tests and subsequently diagnosed Elena
with leukemia.30 As a result of the diagnosis, Elena underwent chemo-
therapy that resulted in the remission of the leukemia.3 1 Lawson then
submitted a claim for benefits to cover the cost of the chemotherapy treat-
ments; however, his insurance carrier, Fortis, denied his claim.3 2 Fortis
contended that the leukemia was a pre-existing condition within the
meaning of the policy.33 Fortis considered the leukemia a pre-existing
condition because the leukemia began and produced the symptoms for
which Elena was treated on October 7, 1998-two days before the effective
26. See id. (discussing difference between different kinds of exclusionary pro-
visions for pre-existing conditions).
27. See Lawson v. Fortis Ins. Co., 301 F.3d 159, 161 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting day
which Lawson purchased insurance policy).
28. See id. (describing Elena's presenting symptoms). All of Elena's symptoms
were non-specific and were associated with many different illnesses. See id. (noting
further testing needed because symptoms persisted).
29. See id. (discussing diagnosis). In addition to the antibiotics, the doctor
also prescribed an anti-allergy medication for Elena. See id. (stating further advised
treatment).
30. See id. (noting series of events that led to diagnosis of leukemia). When
Elena was first seen in the emergency room, the doctor advised Elena's mother to
take Elena for a follow-up visit to their family physician or back to the emergency
room if Elena's symptoms persisted. See id. (discussing doctor's prognosis and ad-
vice). The Lawsons' family physician saw Elena on October.13 because her symp-
toms did not improve. See id. (explaining reason for further visits to doctor).
Nonetheless, on October 14, Elena's grandmother took Elena to a pediatrician
who ordered more tests and ultimately diagnosed Elena with leukemia. See id.
(stating facts).
31. See id. (discussing subsequent treatment of Elena's leukemia).
32. See id. (stating that Lawson filed claim for payment of medical bills under
Fortis policy).
33. See id. (explaining reason why insurance company denied claim). Fortis's
Medical Director "investigated Elena's course of treatment and concluded that
'[w]hile the evaluation [at the Palmerton Emergency Department] failed to diag-
nose leukemia, advice and treatment for those symptoms were received from a
physician.' This meets the policy definition of a pre-existing condition." Id.
2003] CASEBRIEF 1359
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date of Lawson's policy.34 Contrary to Fortis's pre-existing-condition con-
clusion, however, the correct diagnosis of leukemia did not occur until a
few days after the insurance policy became effective.
35
B. Procedural History
The Lawsons sued the insurance company for breach of contract and
bad faith under the relevant Pennsylvania statute. 3 6 The Lawsons won a
$713,901.12 judgment at the trial court level. 3 7 The plaintiffs, however,
were not successful in their claim of bad faith against the insurance com-
pany because they did not meet the necessary burden of proof that the
insurance company acted unreasonably. 3 8 The insurance company ap-
34. See id. (explaining that treatment for condition occurred before effective
date). Fortis's Medical Director went on to "determine[ ] that Elena had a two-
and-a-half week history of fever preceding her diagnosis of leukemia, and he there-
fore concluded that the symptoms for which she was evaluated and treated on
October 7, 1998, were those of leukemia." Id.
35. See id. (contending that Elena had leukemia symptoms all along despite
physician's incorrect diagnosis). After the initial denial by the insurance company,
Lawson appealed the decision to Fortis's Appeal Review Committee, "which con-
cluded that the definition of a pre-existing condition does not require a correct
diagnosis of the condition at the time that it is treated." Id.
36. See Lawson v. Fortis Ins. Co., 146 F. Supp. 2d 737, 739 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(citing grounds for claim).
37. See Lawson, 301 F.3d at 162 (citing amount district court awarded to plain-
tiff on breach of contract claim); see also Lawson, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 747 (granting
summary judgment on breach of contract claim). The district court then ordered
the parties to stipulate to the amount of the medical bills, and on July 27, 2001,
entered a judgment for the plaintiffs in the amount of $713,901.12 plus prejudg-
ment interest. See Lawson, 301 F.3d at 162 (discussing procedural history of case).
38. See Lawson, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 746 (holding that plaintiffs did not meet
burden of proof). Under 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8371 (West 1998), "in order to
recover on a bad faith claim [against an insurer], a plaintiff must show both: (1)
that the insurer lacked a reasonable basis for denying benefits; and (2) that the
insurer knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of reasonable basis." Lawson, 146 F.
Supp. 2d at 746 (citing Klinger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 115 F.3d 230, 233
(3d Cir. 1997)). The court found that Fortis's interpretation of the pre-existing
clause was reasonable. The court noted that "[w]hile the court rejects the defen-
dant's position [that] the clause can only be read to support its interpretation,
other courts have agreed with the defendant that similar clauses are unambigu-
ous." Id. Because the clause is susceptible to many interpretations, the insurance
company did not act unreasonably in denying coverage for Elena's condition. See
id. at 746-47. (explaining that multiple interpretations of clause rule out finding
that Fortis acted unreasonably or recklessly). The court explained that "[m]ere
negligence on the part of the insurer is insufficient to sustain a bad faith claim."
Id. at 746 (citing Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 747, 751 (3d Cir.
1994)). Plaintiffs' evidence in regard to the bad faith claim did not rise to the level
of clear and convincing; therefore, they did not sustain their burden of proof. See
id. ("Although the court finds that Fortis erred in denying coverage, Fortis did not
act in bad faith in doing so."). On appeal, the court upheld the district court's
grant of summary judgment for Fortis on the bad faith claim. See Lawson, 301 F.3d
at 161 (discussing holding).
1360 [Vol. 48: p. 1355
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pealed the part of the decision as to the judgment award to the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. 39
C. Legal Analysis in Lawson
On appeal, the Third Circuit in Lawson affirmed the district court's
decision and held that treatment received for an unsuspected or misdiag-
nosed illness did not constitute a pre-existing condition under the lan-
guage of the policy. 40 The court stated that "the central issue .. . is
whether receiving treatment for the symptoms of an unsuspected or mis-
diagnosed condition prior to the effective date of coverage makes the con-
dition a pre-existing one under the terms of the insurance policy."4 1
Whether a policyholder could receive treatment for a condition unknown
at the time of the alleged treatment concerned the court.4 2 The Third
Circuit began its analysis by looking at the language of the exclusion
clause in the Lawsons' insurance policy. 43 The district court felt that the
language in the clause was ambiguous. 44 The court of appeals agreed,
explaining that two differing but reasonable interpretations could have
been attributed to the policy language. 45 The insurance company con-
tended that "the pre-existing condition language ... does not require ac-
curate diagnosis of the condition, but merely receipt of treatment or
advice for the symptoms of it."4 6 The Lawsons argued that Elena's leuke-
mia was not a pre-existing condition because "one cannot receive treat-
ment 'for' a condition without knowledge of what the condition is." 4 7 The
39. See Lawson, 301 F.3d at 160 (discussing reason for appeal). Fortis ap-
pealed the summary judgment ruling by the district court in favor of the plaintiffs
for their claim of benefits. See id. (explaining merits of Fortis's claim on appeal).
40. See id. at 161 (affirming judgment of district court).
41. Id. at 162 (trying to determine what constitutes condition). According to
the district court, the insurance policy between the Lawsons and Fortis "was ambig-
uous as to whether the pre-existing condition exclusion required a diagnosis of the
condition." Id.
42. See id. (clarifying issue as "whether it is possible to receive treatment 'for' a
condition without knowing what the condition is").
43. See id. (focusing analysis on what constitutes treatment "for" condition).
44. See id. ("The District Court [sic] reasoned that the contract was
ambiguous .... ).
45. See id. at 160 (agreeing that "[p] laintitf's reading of the pre-existing condi-
tion language is reasonable").
46. Id. (citing Fortis's argument). Fortis argued that if a person merely re-
ceives advice or treatment for symptoms of a later diagnosed condition, the symp-
toms constitute a pre-existing condition. See id. (breaking down Fortis's
contention).
47. Id. (citing Lawsons' argument). The Lawsons argued further that treat-
ment of non-specific symptoms is not enough to rise to the level of a pre-existing
condition. See id. at 165 ("Elena received treatment 'for' what were initially diag-
nosed as symptoms of a respiratory tract infection. Therefore, the treatment she
received was not 'for' leukemia, but 'for' a respiratory tract infection.").
20031 CASEBRIEF 1361
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court construed the ambiguity in the policy against the insurance
company.4 8
The ambiguity in the clause turned on the word "for," and, more spe-
cifically, the clause did not clarify what constituted "treatment for a condi-
tion" under the statute.49 The court had to determine whether it was
possible to receive treatment for a condition without being aware of its
existence.50 The court then set out to determine how other federal and
state courts have interpreted similar pre-existing condition language in in-
surance policies. 5
1
In its resulting opinion, the Third Circuit relied heavily on the rea-
soning of the First Circuit in Hughes v. Boston Mutual Life Insurance Co. 52 In
Hughes, a man was treated for non-specific symptoms of multiple sclerosis
prior to the effective date of his policy, but he was not diagnosed with the
illness until after his coverage began.5 3 The First Circuit, like the Third,
found both the insurance company and the insured's interpretations of
the pre-existing clause plausible and, therefore, construed the ambiguity
in favor of the insured. 54 Again, central to the ambiguity was the unclear
language as to what was considered treatment "for" a condition.
55
48. See id. at 160 (stating holding). The court followed its reasoning from
previous cases, stating that "ambiguous terms should be strictly construed against
the insurer." Id. at 162 (citing Med. Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 105
(3d Cir. 1999)). The court stated further: "A contract is ambiguous if it: (1) is
reasonably susceptible to different constructions, (2) is obscure in meaning
through indefiniteness of expression, or (3) has a double meaning." Id. at 163
(quoting Cury v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 737 F. Supp. 847, 853 (E.D. Pa.
1990)).
49. See id. at 165 (observing that key word in exclusion was word "for"). The
court thought that "Elena received treatment 'for' what were initially diagnosed as
symptoms of a respiratory tract infection." Id.
50. See id. at 162 (deciding whether treatment "for" initially diagnosed condi-
tion can be construed as being treated for ultimately diagnosed actual condition).
51. See id. at 163-64 (citing cases on which court relied). The court looked at
cases in the First, Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits, and also at the Western Dis-
trict of New York, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, the New York Supreme Court's
Appellate Division, the Texas Court of Appeals, the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania and the Middle District of Pennsylvania. See id. (delineating various fed-
eral and state courts addressing similar issue).
52. 26 F.3d 264 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that both insurer's and insured's
interpretations of pre-existing condition clause were reasonable). The court in
Hughes concluded that the clause was ambiguous. See id. at 270 (finding pre-ex-
isting condition exclusion "susceptible to 'reasonable but differing interpreta-
tions"') (quoting Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 986 F.2d 580,
586 (1st Cir. 1993)).
53. See Lawson, 301 F.3d at 163 (noting facts of Hughes). Hughes and Lawson
have very similar fact patterns insofar as both insureds presented with non-specific
symptoms before the effective date of the policy and were subsequently diagnosed
with a condition that was then excluded from coverage. See id. (discussing similar-
ity of fact patterns).
54. See id. (explaining holding in Hughes).
55. See id. (discussing problem with construction of clause in Hughes). The
way that the clause was structured led to the ambiguity. See id. (indicating ambigu-
1362 [Vol. 48: p. 1355
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The court noted that the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, the West-
ern District of New York, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals and the New
York Supreme Court's Appellate Division have also followed the logic used
by the First Circuit. 5 6 These courts have posited that "it is not logical to
permit non-specific symptoms, which could be caused by a number of dif-
ferent sicknesses, to be used later as a retroactive trigger for exclusion as a
pre-existing condition."57 These courts require that either the insured or
the physician be aware that the insured was receiving treatment for the
condition, not a cluster of non-symptoms later determined to be the con-
dition in question.5 8
Other circuits, like the Eighth and the Seventh Circuits, believe that
the language in the pre-existing clause does not require a diagnosis of the
condition.5 9 The rationale behind these decisions is that "the pre-existing
condition language is clear and unambiguous that treatment for a condi-
tion does not require accurate diagnosis of the condition."60 Here, the
focus is on when the condition actually began in the body, regardless of
whether a reasonably accurate diagnosis of the condition could be
made.61 This rationale is based on the biological inception of the illness
rather than reasonable diagnostic criteria based on ostensible symptoms. 62
In the last part of its opinion, the court in Lawson focused on the
word "for" in the pre-existing condition clause. 63 Prior to the effective
date of the policy, the court believed that Elena received treatment "for" a
respiratory infection not "for" leukemia. 64 They believed that the word
ity was due to "lack of clarity regarding what constitutes treatment 'for' a
condition").
56. See id. at 163-65 (citing other courts that followed same logic as First
Circuit).
57. Id. at 164 (stating proposition that if clauses are susceptible to reasonable
but different interpretations then clauses are ambiguous).
58. See id. (discussing true meaning of treatment "for" condition).
59. See id. at 165 (noting circuits not in concert with holding).
60. Id. at 164 (explaining that exact diagnosis is not necessary). A cluster of
symptoms that could plausibly be attributed to the ultimate diagnosis is enough to
be considered a pre-existing condition in these jurisdictions. See id. (reviewing
cases holding that discovery and treatment of symptoms trigger pre-existing condi-
tion even without definitive diagnosis).
61. See, e.g., Dowdall v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n of Am., 181
N.E.2d 594, 596 (Mass. 1962) (counting treatment of symptoms as pre-existing
condition even though there was no definitive diagnosis of multiple sclerosis);
Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Bohannon, 488 S.W.2d 476, 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972)
(holding that misdiagnosed blind loop syndrome counted as pre-coverage treat-
ment for anemia).
62. For a discussion on the different definitions of manifestation of an illness,
see supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
63. See Lawson, 301 F.3d at 165 (noting "the key word in the pre-existing con-
dition exclusion for our [the court's] purposes is 'for"').
64. See id. (differentiating between two conditions and their respective
symptomologies).
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"for" had an "implicit intent requirement. 6 5 On October 7, before the
effective date on the policy, no one-Elena, her parents or her physi-
cian-knew that Elena was suffering from leukemia; therefore, no one in-
tended or thought that Elena received treatment "for" leukemia on that
day.6
6
Finally, the court discussed two cases decided at the district court level
in the Third Circuit that the insurance company attempted to use to bol-
ster its argument. 67 In Cury v. Colonial Life Insurance Co. of America,68 the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the in-
sured's multiple sclerosis was not covered because the insured was treated
for the symptoms of undiagnosed multiple sclerosis prior to the effective
date of the insurance policy.69 The court also stated that "[t]here is no
requirement that a diagnosis, definite or otherwise, of the pre-existing
condition must be made during the pre-existing condition period. '70 Sim-
ilarly, in McWilliams v. Capital Telecommunications Inc.,7 1 the District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania explained that the policy language
did not limit pre-existing conditions to those that were diagnosed before
the effective date of the plan. 72 In that case, the insured had received an
ultrasound for a thyroid lump in the period before the policy became ef-
fective and was diagnosed with thyroid cancer shortly after coverage
began. 7
3
65. See id. (setting out definition of "for"). The court turned to dictionaries
for guidance. They found the word "for" defined as follows:
Webster's Dictionary states that "for" is 'used as a function word to indi-
cate purpose.' WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 481
(1986). Black's Law Dictionary similarly states that the word 'connotes
the end with reference to which anything is, acts, serves, or is done. In
consideration of which, in view of which, or with reference to which, any-
thing is done or takes place.' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 579-80 (5th ed.
1979).
Id.
66. See id. (stating that insurance company failed to meet intent). No one,
including Elena's parents or physician, intended for her to get treatment for leuke-
mia on October 7, 1998. See id. (interpreting word "for" as having implicit intent
requirement and applying to facts of case).
67. See id. (distinguishing present decision from other similar holdings).
68. 737 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
69. See id. at 849 (discussing holding).
70. Id. at 854 (examining language of clause). The court looked to the plain
language of the clause and found that the clause "only requires that the claimant
either (a) receive medical treatment or consultation; (b) have medical care or
services; (c) have diagnostic tests, [sic] or (d) take prescribed drugs or medicines
within 90 days prior to your effective date." Id.
71. 986 F. Supp. 920 (M.D. Pa. 1997).
72. See id. at 927 (stating proposition that doctor does not have to define
illness)
73. See id. at 922 (discussing facts). Plaintiff had a history of lumps, which
either were benign or had disappeared on their own. See id. (describing plaintiffs
medical history). Plaintiff was not particularly concerned about this biopsy, for
"she thought the lump in her thyroid was just another mass that was either benign
or would go away on its own." Id.
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The Lawson court distinguished its holding from the former two be-
cause in Cury and McWilliams, the insureds went to the physician for a
suspected condition.7 4 It was quite possible that the physician suspected a
certain condition, and the "pre-effective date treatment, advice or testing
turned out to be 'for' the condition that was ultimately diagnosed."
75
Also, the court was not persuaded by the analyses in Cury and McWilliams
because those cases focused "primarily on the absence of a diagnosis re-
quirement,"76 rather than examining the ambiguity in the language of the
exclusion clause itself.77 In summary, the court stated:
[I]t is hard to see how a doctor can provide treatment "for" a
condition without knowing what that condition is or that it even
exists. Thus, in our view, the best reading of the contract lan-
guage in this case is for coverage of Elena's leukemia treatment.
At worst, the language is ambiguous and must therefore be read
in favor of the insureds.7 8
74. See Lawson v. Fortis Ins. Co., 301 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting
factual distinctions among cases). In Cury and McWilliams there were symptoms
that were more specific than the symptoms that Elena Lawson had. The court
noted that "[iln these cases, because the claimants suspected a particular condi-
tion when they saw their physicians, it might make sense to say that the claimants
had received advice or treatment 'for' their respective conditions, although they
had not been definitively diagnosed." Id.
75. Id. at 166 (analyzing differences). The patient already suspected the con-
dition, thus the treatment or advice given was in furtherance of finding out the
ultimate diagnosis of the malady. See id. (reporting that "pre-effective date treat-
ment, advice, or testing" on these facts triggered pre-existing condition clause).
76. Id. (discussing analysis of Cuy and McWilliams). The court in Lawson
found the analyses in these cases unconvincing because each case focused on only
one part of the broader analysis. See id. (stating preference for construing lan-
guage of policy).
77. See id. (explaining that ambiguity in language was important element in
analysis). The court thought that there was too much focus on the diagnosis re-
quirement in Cuty and McWilliams "without seriously considering whether the lan-
guage concerning treatment 'for' a particular condition is ambiguous." Id.
(quoting Hughes v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 264, 270 n.5 (1st Cir. 1994)).
78. Id. at 165 (stating reasons for holding). In its best reading of the clause,
the court felt that Elena was being treated "for" symptoms of a respiratory tract
infection in the pre-coverage period, not leukemia; thus, she would be covered for
the leukemia since it was diagnosed after the effective date. See id. (noting that
possibility that "Elena's condition was actually leukemia" never entered Elena's
parents' nor Dr. Parika's minds). In its worst reading of the clause, the ambiguity
had to be construed against the insurers based on prior precedent. See id. at 167
(construing insurance policy strictly against Fortis). For a discussion of the prece-
dent for construing ambiguity in insurance policies, see supra note 48.
20031 1365
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IV. FEDERAL COURTS' VARIED INTERPRETATIONS OF PRE-EXISTING
CONDITION EXCLUSIONS
A. When Does an Illness Begin?
Federal courts differ in how to construe when an illness manifests. 79
Some circuits, like the First and the Fifth, "require some awareness on the
part of the insured or the physician that the insured is receiving treatment
for the condition itself."80 The First Circuit has even gone a bit further
and acknowledged the inherent ambiguity in some of these clauses.81
Other circuits, like the Eighth, however, do not require a diagnosis in or-
der for a condition to exist.8 2 One circuit in particular, the Seventh, has
handed down conflicting decisions, vacillating between the two con-
structs. 83 These conflicting interpretations have led to various interpreta-
tions of pre-existing condition exclusion language.8 4 Each circuit will be
looked at in turn.8 5
B. The First Circuit's Approach-Looking at Ambiguity
In Lawson, the court centered its discussion on the analysis in Hughes
v. Boston Mutual Life Insurance Co.8 6 In Hughes, the court determined "if
terms contained in the exclusionary clause are found to be susceptible to
more than one reasonable interpretation,"87 then the exclusion should be
found to be ambiguous. The court's approach turned on the interpreta-
tion of "treatment 'for' a condition," which the court felt had more than
one plausible meaning.8 8 Hughes was denied coverage by his insurer for
79. See Lawson, 301 F.3d at 163 (noting that federal courts have interpreted
pre-existing language differently).
80. Id. at 164 (explaining how other circuits construe exclusion clauses).
81. For a discussion of the First Circuit's treatment of pre-existing condition
clauses, see infra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
82. For a discussion on the differences in how the Eighth Circuit deals with
pre-existing condition language in health care policies, see infra notes 108-16 and
accompanying text.
83. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's incongruent holdings, see infra
notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
84. See Lawson, 301 F.3d at 163-64 (noting courts' differing interpretations).
85. For a discussion of each of the circuits, see infra notes 86-128 and accom-
panying text.
86. For a discussion of the Lawson court's reliance on Hughes, see supra notes
52-55 and accompanying text.
87. Franco, supra note 1, at 903 (summarizing holding in Hughes). The con-
tra proferentem doctrine dictates that ambiguity is construed against the insurer.
See id. (explaining doctrine of contra proferentem). The rationale of contra
proferentem centers on what a reasonable policyholder would construe the policy
to mean, rather than focusing on what the insurer intended the policy to mean.
See id. at 903-04 (noting rationale of doctrine of contra proferentem). This doc-
trine protects "unsuspecting insureds." Id. at 903.
88. See Hughes v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 264, 269 (1st Cir. 1994)
(acknowledging more than one reasonable interpretation).
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being treated for symptoms later determined to be multiple sclerosis. 89
Hughes was not diagnosed with multiple sclerosis until after his insurance
policy became effective. 90 The court did acknowledge that an "exclusion
does not explicitly require diagnosis;" however, it was disturbing to the
court that the clause did not define "what constitutes treatment 'for' a
particular condition."9 1 The insurance company argued that "treatment
'for' a condition refers to treatment of any symptom which in hindsight
appears to be a manifestation of the condition."92 Hughes argued that the
correct interpretation of the clause was the holding in Ross v. Western Fidel-
ity Insurance Co. that either the doctor or the insured must be aware that
the insured is in fact receiving treatment for a condition.9 3 The court felt
that both of these interpretations could reasonably be attributed to the
exclusionary clause. Thus, the clause was ambiguous and should be con-
strued in favor of the insured.
94
C. The Fifth Circuit's Approach-Illness Has to Be Apparent
According to the Fifth Circuit in Ross v. Western Fidelity Insurance Co.,
9 5
a sickness has manifested itself when it is "apparent, obvious, or plain."
9 6
In Ross, the court held that an infant girl's heart defect was not a pre-
existing condition and therefore her subsequent heart operation was cov-
89. See id. at 266 (listing presenting symptoms). Hughes complained of
"numbness in both lower extremities, loss of balance, and gastrointestinal
problems." Id. Hughes's symptoms were "not amenable to any type of clinical
diagnosis" before the effective date of his policy. Id. (referring to deposition testi-
mony of several physicians).
90. See id. at 267 (citing date of diagnosis). A physician diagnosed Hughes
with multiple sclerosis on March 10, 1988. See id. (specifying date Hughes was
diagnosed). This diagnosis was made during the first six months of his probation-
ary period. See id. (indicating probationary period ran from February 1, 1988 to
July 1, 1988). Hughes's insurance company would not cover his condition because
the company contended that he received treatment for multiple sclerosis "within
the 6 months prior to the insured's effective date." Id. at 266.
91. Id. at 269 (holding lack of definition leaves open possibility of more than
one interpretation).
92. Id. (citing insurance company's interpretation). The insurance company
cited Cuiy v. Colonial Life Insurance Co. of America, 737 F. Supp. 847, 854-55 (E.D. Pa.
1990). In Cury, the court held that treatment for symptoms of undiagnosed multi-
ple sclerosis before the effective date triggered pre-existing condition exclusion.
See Cuiy, 737 F. Supp. at 854 (opining that there "is no requirement that a diagno-
sis.., of the pre-existing condition must be made during the pre-existing condi-
tion period").
93. See Hughes, 26 F.3d at 269 (citing Fifth Circuit case). For a further discus-
sion of Ross v. Western Fidelity Insurance Co., 872 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1989), see infra
notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
94. See Hughes, 26 F.3d at 270 ("Because the exclusion is susceptible to 'rea-
sonable but differing interpretations,' we [the court] find it to be ambiguous.")
(quoting Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 986 F.2d 580, 586 (1st
Cir. 1993)).
95. 872 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1989).
96. Id. at 669 (explaining court's definition of manifest).
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ered by her parents' insurance policy.97 The insurance company had two
clauses for the definition of pre-existing conditions."8 One related to
when treatment for a condition is administered and the other related to
when a sickness first manifests itself.99 Reading the plain language of the
policy, the court rejected both of the insurance company's arguments.10 0
As to the meaning of the first clause, the child was diagnosed with pulmo-
nary hypertension rather than the heart defect; thus, the treatment she
received "could not have been for that condition."10' The court reasoned
that a doctor could not treat a particular condition that is not known.1t 2
Upon rehearing, the court did note, however, that while a "diagnosis is
[not] always required in order for the underlying condition to be
treated .... treatment for a specific condition cannot be received unless the
specific condition is known."' (' The court also rejected the insurance
company's contention that there were symptoms that may have been
caused by a heart defect and, therefore, the sickness had manifested it-
self. 1 4 Similar to the facts in Hughes, the heart defect was not diagnosed
until after the effective date of the policy.' 0 5 The court understood the
word "manifest" in its everyday meaning, that is, "apparent, obvious, or
97. See id. (explaining heart condition was not known at time previous to in-
ception of coverage).
98. See id. at 668 (reading two clauses together to determine meaning).
99. See id. at 668-69 (defining two clauses). The court characterized the two
clauses in the following way:
The first clause defines "pre-existing condition" in terms of symptoms
that would cause an ordinarily prudent person to seek medical attention,
while the second clause defines "pre-existing condition" as a condition
that did cause the insured to obtain medical attention. Reading the
clauses together, we [the court] conclude that the first clause applies to
situations in which the insured had symptoms of a condition but failed to
seek diagnosis, care or treatment, whereas the second clause applies to
situations in which advice or treatment regarding the condition was actu-
ally obtained.
Id. (emphasis in original).
100. See id. at 669 (continuing analysis). The court believed that the defini-
tional distinction between the two clauses was intentional, apparent and unambig-
uous. See id. (explaining reasoning of court).
101. Id. at 669 (emphasis in original) (explaining logic). The pulmonary hy-
pertension was the only diagnosis at that particular time. See id. (detailing facts of
case).
102. See id. (stating that underlying condition needs to be capable of being
reasonably diagnosed).
103. Ross v. W. Fid, Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 142, 144 (5th Cir. 1989) (emphasis in
original) (clarifying holding). Upon rehearing, the court further explained its
holding. See id. (detailing implications of holding). Diagnosis is not always re-
quired to consider an underlying condition to be treated, but awareness is neces-
sary. See id. (concluding that treatment "for a specific condition" requires knowledge
of condition).
104. See Ross, 872 F.2d at 669 (noting that only pulmonary hypertension was
present).
105. See id. ("The heart defect here did not manifest itself during the ex-
cluded time frame.").
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plain."10 6 Only the symptoms were present; the condition of a heart de-
fect was not.
10 7
D. The Eighth Circuit's Approach-Manifestation Does Not Equal Knowledge;
Diagnosis Is Not Necessary
In interpreting exclusion clauses, the Eighth Circuit looks to the
meaning of manifest; it construes manifest in the biological sense.' 08
Here, manifest is defined less by knowledge and more by the effect of the
disease on the body, whether known or not.' 0 9 In Kirk v. Provident Life &
Accident Insurance Co.,' 10 the court denied benefits to a man who devel-
oped a condition, bacterial endocarditis, before his policy became effec-
tive."' The court subsequently determined that he developed the
condition prior to the effective date, even though he was not diagnosed at
that time. 1 2 The court focused on the time when the illness actually be-
gan, not when a reasonable diagnosis could be made.I'- The Eighth Cir-
cuit agreed with the district court and found that "although the
endocarditis was not diagnosed until after the effective date of the policy,
the infection began prior to the effective date."' 14 Thus, the start of the
infection, though latent, was considered the start of the illness. 1 5 As
106. Id. (explaining that everyday meaning of manifest is applicable in
analysis).
107. See id. (noting absence of condition). It did not matter to the court that
the symptoms that were present could have been caused by the heart defect be-
cause at that time there was no such diagnosis. See id. (finding presence of symp-
toms irrelevant where heart defect was not diagnosed).
108. See Kirk v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 942 F.2d 504, 506 (8th
Cir. 1991) (noting there were indications that infection was present). The court
equates manifest with "became active." Id.
109. See id. at 505 (explaining "relevant inquiry was when the illness began,
not the point of diagnosis"). The dissent had a major disagreement with the ma-
jority on this point. See id. (addressing majority's contentions). The dissenting
judge thought the proper question was "when [did] sufficient symptoms exist to
allow a reasonably accurate diagnosis of the case." Id. (Bright, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing State Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Stamper, 312 S.W.2d 441, 442 (Ark. 1958)).
110. 942 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1991).
111. See id. at 506 (noting symptoms of bacterial endocarditis). Kirk had
symptoms of intermittent fevers, night sweats, a skin lesion and aches and pains.
See id. (discussing facts).
112. See id. (explaining that time period of onset could be determined). A
specialist in infectious diseases testified at trial with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that Kirk had the condition for about three months prior to the surgery
during the exclusionary period. See id. (discussing facts).
113. See id. (discussing concurrence among doctors about date of onset). The
court noted that "[tihe doctors who examined Kirk were in agreement that the
symptoms for which Kirk sought treatment in March 1988, [sic] stemmed from
bacterial endocarditis; that is, the disease first manifested itself or became active in
March." Id.
114. Id. at 505 (citing district court analysis).
115. See id. at 506 (acknowledging that test did not show condition was pre-
sent). During the exclusionary period, blood culture did not produce any bacte-
rial growth. See id. (detailing test procedure).
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such, regardless of whether a doctor or the insured has knowledge of an
illness, the biological inception date of the condition controls.' 1 6
E. The Seventh Circuit's Approach-Diagnosis Is Not Necessary or Is It?
The Seventh Circuit has handed down conflicting decisions regarding
treatment of pre-existing condition exclusion clauses.' 17 In Bullwinkel v.
New England Mutual Life Insurance Co.,11 8 the Seventh Circuit decided that
a diagnosis was not necessary in order to exclude a condition from cover-
age.' 19 Conversely, in Pitcher v. Principal Mutual Life Insurance Co., 1 20 the
court held that some awareness on the part of the physician or the insured
was necessary in order to exclude a condition from coverage. 121 While
seemingly interpreting pre-existing exclusion clauses in different ways, the
Seventh Circuit distinguishes between the two cases based on the kind of
illness from which the plaintiff suffered.1 22 In Bullwinkel, a woman had a
lump in her breast checked before her new health insurance began.'
23
The doctor did not believe it to be cancerous, but referred her to a sur-
geon as a precautionary measure. 124 She visited the surgeon two weeks
after her insurance was effective, and the surgeon subsequently removed
the lump, which turned out to be cancerous.' 25 In Pitcher, a woman also
had a lump in her breast, but the court deemed that she "did not receive a
,treatment or service' for breast cancer ... because she was being moni-
tored for the longstanding fibrocystic breast condition and not cancer dur-
116. See id. (explaining reasoning behind analysis). The court noted, "while
there was no objective data to confirm a diagnosis of endocarditis until the echo-
cardiogram was done, the flu-like symptoms, high white blood cell count, swelling,
and fever, were all indications that the infection was present." Id.
117. See, e.g., Bullwinkel v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 429 (7th
Cir. 1994) (holding that diagnosis is not necessary to activate exclusion). But see,
e.g., Pitcher v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 407 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that
awareness of condition is necessary).
118. 18 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 1994).
119. See id. (providing holding).
120. 93 F.3d 407 (7th Cir. 1996).
121. See id. at 412 (citing holding).
122. See id. at 415 (discussing prior precedent). Each plaintiff in these cases
was presented as having a lump in her breast, but in Buliwinkel, the plaintiff "suf-
fered from cancer and only cance?' and had "no history of a fibrocystic breast condi-
tion." Id. (emphasis in original); see Lawson v. Fortis Ins. Co., 301 F.3d 159, 164 n.3
(3d Cir. 2002) (noting circuit split).
123. See Bullwinkel, 18 F.3d at 430 (discussing facts of case).
124. See id. at 430 (explaining procedures). Because the doctor sent
Bullwinkel to the surgeon for a biopsy, the argument that the doctor treated her
"for" cancer gained credence. See id. (noting purpose of surgery).
125. See id. (detailing events leading up to diagnosis). After the doctor re-
moved the lump, Ms. Bullwinkel had additional cancer treatment consisting of
surgery, radiation treatment and chemotherapy. See id. (noting further medical
treatment).
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ing the pre-coverage period. 1 26 The difference, the court noted, was that
Ms. Pitcher arranged pre-coverage treatment for cystic fibrosis and not
breast cancer, as it later turned out to be.127 On the other hand, Ms.
Bullwinkel made her appointment out of concern over a potentially can-
cerous lump, and, thus, her visit and treatment was related to cancer.
128
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RULING
A. Best Interpretation of Pre-existing Condition Clauses
As discussed, different federal and state courts have attempted to
identify the best treatment of policy language dealing with pre-existing
conditions. 129 Manifestation of illness can be seen as a continuum with
the biological inception of the illness at one end and actual knowledge of
the illness at the other. 130 In a case about whether coverage is due to an
insured, an insurance company will argue for limiting coverage based on
the biological inception date of an illness, thus manifestation "moves back
further in time, excluding more conditions from coverage." 13 1 Con-
versely, the insured will argue that manifestation of the disease occurs
when the insured has actual knowledge of the condition. 132 Having actual
knowledge of an illness will generally occur much later in the process than
actual biological inception, and, thus, more medical conditions would be
included in coverage.' 3 3 The Third Circuit, like the First, Fifth and, in
126. Pitcher, 93 F.3d at 412 (emphasis in original) (discussing reasoning for
holding). The court did not feel that a mammogram constituted treatment, for "it
is a purely diagnostic procedure." Id.
127. See id. (differentiating between two conditions). The court reasoned, "a
fibrocystic breast condition is unrelated to cancer, even though it manifests itself
in the same area of the body as breast cancer and takes on the form of cysts, masses,
and formations of fibrous tissue." Id. (emphasis in original).
128. See Bullwinkel 18 F.3d at 432 (noting that discovery of cancer in Septem-
ber meant Ms. Bullwinkel had cancer in July as well). The court also noted that
the discovered lump was "not a trivial or inconclusive symptom." Id. at 433 (citing
Kirk v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 942 F.2d 504, 506 (8th Cir. 1991)).
129. For a discussion of different federal and state courts' treatment of pre-
existing condition exclusion clauses, see supra notes 79-128 and accompanying
text.
130. See Sampson, supra note 16, at 93 (explaining how manifestation can be
structured like continuum).
131. Id. Insurance companies will want as large a time frame as possible to
increase the chance that the condition will fall within the exclusionary period. See
id. (discussing insurance companies' stance).
132. See id. (noting that insured will argue shortest time frame). Actual
knowledge is accomplished through medical examination and/or physician's ad-
vice. See id. (providing standard for establishing actual knowledge of condition).
133. See id. (discussing impact of actual knowledge requirement). Having ac-
tual knowledge will mean an increased chance of coverage for a condition. See id.
(same).
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some cases, the Seventh Circuit, has required the latter: there must be
some awareness of the condition for which a person is being treated.
134
B. Policy Considerations
The court in Lawson acknowledged that it based its decision partly on
policy.135 After all, holding against the insured could result in bad public
policy. 1
36
1. Knowledge of a Condition Is Necessary
Not imputing knowledge in pre-existing clauses "would invite insurers
to search for prior diagnoses for symptoms that were not inconsistent with
an ultimate diagnosis in order to deny coverage as a pre-existing condi-
tion."'137 Thus, an insurance company could deny coverage if the com-
pany could find a symptom that was consistent with ultimate diagnosis.'
38
This symptom could be non-specific-a symptom that could be associated
with many illnesses, one of which is the illness in dispute. 139 Non-specific
symptoms can be caused by any number of conditions.
14
The purpose of the pre-existing clause is to "protect innocent pre-
mium paying insureds from being deprived of benefits for preexisting con-
1.34. See Lawson v. Fortis Ins. Co., 301 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting
holding and discussing other circuits' treatment of language).
135. See id. (giving reasons for policy considerations); see also Franco, supra
note 1, at 883 (citing devastating effects when families are denied coverage).
136, See Franco, supra note 1, at 883 (citing policy implications).
137. Misdiagnosed Leukemia Is Not Pre-existing Condition, 11 No. 9 LEGAL No-TEs
INS. 7 (Oakstone Legal & Bus. Publ'g, Inc. Nov. 2002) (citing policy implications);
see Lawson, 301 F.3d at 166 (giving policy reason for ruling). The court noted,
"considering treatment for symptoms of a not-yet-diagnosed condition as
equivalent to treatment of the underlying condition ultimately diagnosed might
open the door for insurance companies to deny coverage for any condition the
symptoms of which were treated during the exclusionary period." Id.
138. See Lawson, 301 F.3d at 166 (providing further rationale for decision).
The court cites a Wisconsin District Court case when providing: "to permit such
backward-looking reinterpretation of symptoms to support claim denials would so
greatly expand the definition of preexisting condition as to make that term mean-
ingless: any prior symptom not be inconsistent with the ultimate diagnosis would
provide the basis for denial." Id. (quoting In re Estate of Monica Ermenc, 585
N.W.2d 679, 685 (Wis. 1998)).
139. See Lawson, 301 F.3d at 166 (noting that physician did not consider
child's condition because, at first look, child's symptoms did not rise to level of
leukemia).
140. See id. (explaining that non-specific symptoms does not mean manifested
condition). The court noted:
When the patient exhibits only non-specific symptoms and neither the
patient nor the physician has a particular concern in mind, or when the
patient turns out not to a suspected disease, it is awkward at best to sug-
gest that the patient sought or received treatment for the disease because
there is no connection between the treatment or advice received and the
sickness.
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ditions of which they have no knowledge."' 4 1 There are many illnesses
that are latent and do not manifest themselves for many years, and "[t] o
deny coverage because of an incipient disease that has not made itself
manifest ... is to set an unconscionable trap for the unwary insured."'142
Insurance policies are supposed to protect people, and it is only right that
people know the extent of their coverage. 143
2. Inherent Ambiguity in Pre-Existing Clauses Should Be Construed Against
the Insurer
Insurance policies are complex documents and few policyholders can
be expected to understand their meaning fully. 144 The court in Lawson
explained that the clause at issue was subject to two differing but reasona-
ble explanations. 14 5 If a court finds that an exclusionary clause can lead
to conflicting but plausible explanations, as did the Lawson court, these
courts should find the clause ambiguous.' 46 By construing the ambigui-
141. Franco, supra note 1, at 901 (citing Hardester v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 841 F. Supp. 714, 716 (D. Md. 1994)). One commentator notes, "to consider
a disease to exist at a time when the victim is blissfully unaware of the medical
'seeds' visited upon his [or her] body, is to set a trap for the unwary purchaser of
health insurance policies." Id. (quoting Hardester, 841 F. Supp. at 716).
142. Lawson, 301 F.3d at 166 (quoting Ranieli v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 413
A.2d 396, 401 (Pa. Super. 1979)). The court stated:
The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that recovery under a pre-existing
condition clause was "conditioned on the fact that prior to the stipulated
date, the sickness was not manifest, nor could it have been diagnosed
with reasonable certainty by one learned in medicine." The [Penn-
sylvania Superior Court] found such a policy to be "reasonable and
salutary."
Id. (quoting Ranieli v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 413 A.2d 396, 401 (Pa. Super.
1979)). In Ranieli, doctors diagnosed a man with a disease in which the vessels
within the kidney had been damaged or hardened because of high blood pressure.
See Ranieli v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 413 A.2d 396, 397 (Pa. Super. 1979) (stat-
ing facts). His insurance company contended that he suffered from this ailment
during the exclusionary period because he had high blood pressure and albumin
in his urine. See id. (discussing defendant's arguments). While these are symp-
toms of glomerulonephritis, they can also be symptoms of other ailments. See id.
(noting underlying science).
143. See Franco, supra note 1, at 901 (identifying goal of health insurance). As
one commentator aptly states, "[t]he goal of protecting innocent insureds will be
distorted if insurers are allowed to deny coverage based on unknown conditions."
Id.
144. See id. (noting that most insureds do not even read their insurance poli-
cies). Most insurance policies are not written in plain language. See id. (providing
that laypersons cannot easily understand majority of insurance policies).
145. See Lawson, 301 F.3d at 167 (holding that clause at issue introduced mul-
tiple reasonable interpretations).
146. See Franco, supra note 1, at 903 (determining that court should apply
doctrine of ambiguity if clause is unclear); see also Lawson, 301 F.3d at 167 (quoting
Myrtil v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 510 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Pa. 1981) and Cohen v.
Erie Indem. Co., 432 A.2d 596 (Pa. Super. 1981)). In Myrtil, the court stated that
"if reasonably intelligent people differ as to the meaning of a policy provision,
ambiguity exists." 510 F. Stipp. at 1202. Also, in Cohen, the court noted "the mere
19
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ties in favor of the insured, the courts maintain coverage for innocent in-
sureds who do not understand the intricacies of the policy language.
147
C. Protection for Insurers
The primary purpose of the pre-existing condition exclusion is that
insurance companies are not saddled with the responsibility of providing
coverage for a fraudulent policy applicant.148 In light of the Lawson deci-
sion, it seems that insurance companies have no recourse when it comes to
pre-existing condition exclusion clauses.1 49 For example, even if insur-
ance companies structure the language of the exclusion clause exactly as it
appears in the Pennsylvania Code, the clause is not necessarily considered
unambiguous. 1 50 Just as insureds need protection, insurance companies
need some safeguard to ensure that the company does not have to carry
someone that will cost an inordinate and unfair amount of money. 15 1 In
other words, companies need protection from "people who only want to
pay for insurance when they need it."1'5 2 If not, many insurance compa-
nies may go out of business, and, with the increasing cost of health care,
companies must exist to adequately cover the people who do need
insurance.15
3
fact that several appellate courts have ruled in favor of a construction denying
coverage, and several others have reached directly contrary conclusions, viewing
almost identical policy provisions, itself creates the inescapable conclusion that the
provision in issue is susceptible to more than one interpretation." 432 A.2d at 599.
Even though the two previous decisions came down more than twenty years ago,
the sentiment is applicable in the Lawson case. See Lawson, 301 F.3d at 167 (apply-
ing reasoning of Myrtil and Cohen).
147. See Franco, supra note 1, at 903-04 (explaining why it is fair to protect
insurers). Unsuspecting insureds may find the policy terms misleading. See id.
(noting complexity of insurance policy agreements).
148. See id. at 900 (explaining rationale for exclusion clauses). The objective
of the clause is to "act as a safeguard against fraudulent insurance applicants." Id.
149. See 31 PA. CODE § 88.52 (2003) (noting definitional constructions of pre-
existing condition exclusion clauses).
150. See id. (noting that identical construction does not save insurance com-
pany). The Code provides, "the fact that State regulations contain a definition of
'preexisting condition' that is virtually identical to that contained in an insured's
policy does not conclusively demonstrate that the policy definition is unambigu-
ous." Id.; cf Lawson v. Fortis Ins. Co., 146 F. Supp. 2d 737, 744 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
(noting that other factors might be involved in determining ambiguity).
151. See Franco, supra note 1, at 900 (noting that pre-existing clauses are that
safeguard). For a discussion of the use of the pre-existing clause as a safeguard for
insurance companies, see supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text.
152. Franco, supra note 1, at 901 (noting that people might try to take advan-
tage of insurance companies).
153. See id. at 885-86 (explaining that pooled money that people pay to insur-
ance companies is placed into find in order for insurance companies to give out
benefits to those who truly need it).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Pre-existing exclusion clauses are necessary for insurance companies
to minimize the skyrocketing costs of health care.'15 4 Equally important,
people who need health insurance must receive that coverage.' 55 Mere
semantic constructions of policy language should not leave people who
rightly deserve insurance unprotected.' 56 Further, people should not
have to guess about what treatment "for" a condition means. Nor should
they be denied coverage without even knowing the condition for which
they are receiving treatment. 157 Insurance companies should not be al-
lowed to use non-specific symptoms that appeared during the exclusion
period along with a physician's hindsight to deny a person coverage for a
condition that manifests itself after the policy's effective date. 158 Litigants
in the Third Circuit need to realize that they may be covered for a condi-
tion if they fit this criterion. Similarly, insurance companies need to be
careful how they write exclusions to keep them free from ambiguity.'
59
Insurance companies also need to realize that the mere existence of symp-
toms of a particular condition before the effective date will not preclude
them from having to provide coverage for an insured. In the end, though,
it is necessary to keep insurance premiums affordable for all consumers of
health care by providing insurance fairly and keeping insurance compa-
nies in business.
Christina M. Finello
154. See Pearlstein, supra note 19, at A4 (explaining that eliminating pre-ex-
isting condition exclusion clause would increase insurance costs for insureds).
155. See Franco, supra note 1, at 885-86 (discussing importance of health care
insurance for people to receive adequate health care).
156. See Lawson v. Fortis Ins. Co., 301 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2002) (acknowl-
edging impact of decision). The judges on the panel knew that it would be dan-
gerous to condone ambiguity in pre-existing condition exclusion clauses. See id.
(providing rationale).
157. See Franco, supra note 1, at 901 (noting that "insurance companies are
not required to have applicants examined by physicians in order to rely on the
preexisting defense"). While insurance companies do not have to follow stringent
practices, insurance applicants have to provide a complete medical history or risk
being denied for failure to provide full disclosure. See id. (noting differences in
practices).
158. For a discussion of support for this assertion, see supra notes 46-51 and
accompanying text.
159. For a discussion of the regulatory language for pre-existing exclusion
clauses, see supra notes 11, 149-50 and accompanying text.
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